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The Welfare Effects of State Trading Enterprises: the Case of US-Canada 
Malting Barley Trade 
 
 
Although advances in WTO led efforts toward free trade agreements have 
reduced explicit policy induced distortions in globally traded commodities, the potential 
for policy shifts toward implicit distortions certainly remains quite viable.  For example, 
State Trading Enterprises (STEs) maintain internationally legal and internal strategies 
that several countries use to obtain an advantageous position in world markets.  As early 
as 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) acknowledged State 
Trading Enterprises (STEs) as legitimate participants in international trade.  The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) defines STEs as “government and nongovernmental 
enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special 
rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of 
which they influence through purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or 
exports.(citation)”  In 1995/96, there were about 100 STEs reported to WTO by 32 
countries.  State trading is more prevalent in agriculture than in any other industries.  
STEs operate in a broad range of agricultural commodities and mostly traded in grains 
and dairy products. 
Normally, STEs have single desk marketing functions and engage in price 
pooling.  With these privileges, which are unavailable to commercial firms, STEs may 
exert influence on world grain market.  The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a single-
desk state trading agency responsible for the marketing of all wheat and barley sold for 
human domestic consumption and for export.  The U.S. is the biggest importer of 
Canadian six-row malting barley and its imports of malting barley from Canada have 
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interesting questions arise as a result of the CWB position in this market.  First, is 
Canada utilizing the STE as a strategy to exploit the U.S. malting barley market and 
second, what are the welfare effects resulting from the STE?   
The role of the CWB has been the subject of many investigations.  Several 
studies test the market power of the CWB (such as Schmitz et al, 1997; Schmitz and 
Gray, 2000; and Carter, 1993; etc), some studies examine the price discrimination of the 
CWB (such as Brooks and Schmitz, 1999; etc), and some studies compare the CWB 
against multiple sellers (Gray et al, 1993; Schmitz and Gray, 2000; and Clark 1995).  
Although there have been a few studies on comparing the CWB and multiple sellers, 
most of them concentrates on the wheat market or feed barley market.  The U.S. is the 
largest importer of Canadian six-row malting barley and almost all the malting barley 
imported by the U.S comes from Canada.  Therefore, the operation of the CWB has 
direct and potentially great impact on U.S. malting barley market.       
This study aims to analyze the welfare effects of STEs as it applies to the US-
Canada malting barley trade.  A policy simulation was developed to determine the 
redistributive efficiency of single STE, a competitive structure, and a structure with 
oligopolistic processors.  The modeling effort is of the type used by Huang and Sexton 
(1996).  It adopts the perspective of the CWB, seeking to maximize pool returns of 
malting barley within a single market year.  
 
  Background 
The CWB is a single-desk state trading agency responsible for the marketing of 
all wheat and barley sold for human domestic consumption and for export with the 
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Columbia.  Those areas typically produce 95 percent of the Canadian barley crop.   
One of the major responsibilities of the CWB is to market wheat and barley in 
order to maximize returns to prairie producers. At the beginning of each crop year, the 
government establishes initial producer payments for grain sold to the CWB.  The initial 
payment is a type of down-payment and, though not a guarantee, is often considered a 
price floor that has been supported by Canadian tax revenue.  While it is not the full 
acquisition price if the pool generates a surplus on annual sales, further payments are 
not guaranteed.  To avoid a deficit in the pool, the initial payment is set low enough.  
Usually, the initial payment is well below the final pooled price, normally set at 70 to 85 
percent of the total estimated pool return.  The farmers get an initial payment upon 
delivery, which is guaranteed by the government.  Once the CWB has marketed all the 
grain in a particular pool, the revenue is pooled, and freight and handling charges are 
deducted.  If returns to pool exceed the sum of initial payment, then a final payment is 
distributed to each individual producer based on the relative producer share of grain in 
that particular pool.  Should returns fall short, the federal government will make up the 
difference. 
The practice of price pooling makes the final price paid to producers a blended 
price based on net revenue of all sales in foreign and domestic markets.  The STEs pay 
producers a same return regardless of the time of delivery during the marketing year.  
Through delayed payments to producers, STEs could have greater flexibility in pricing 
which is not available to private exporters who have to compete in acquiring exportable 
products.   
  4Demand for malting barley is derived from the demand for malt, which in turn 
is driven by the demand for beer.  A small amount of barley is also used directly for 
human consumption.  For marketing purposes, barley is classified into feed and malting 
varieties. Malting barley is simply high-quality barley that has the appropriate 
characteristics to produce good malt.  The malting barley is further divided into two-row 
(2R) and six-row white (6RW) aleurone barley and six-row blue aleurone (6RB) 
varieties, for which brewer demands differ. 
Farmers in Canada grow both 2-row and 6-row varieties of barley.  Since 1991, 
plantings of 6-row white varieties have increased much due to the contracts for the U.S. 
market.  In general, in the world market, malt demand consists almost entirely of two-
row varieties, except U.S. and some North American brewers make extensive use of 
malt produced with six-row white aleurone barley.  The U.S. has been Canada’s largest 
market for six-row malting barley.  The United States also exports malting barley, but 
due to large population and high per capita beer consumption, it is also a large net 
importer of malting barley.  The United States and China are the top two importers of 
Canadian malting barley and they account for about one-half of the world’s malting 
barley imports in recent years.   
 
Analytical Model  
A firm that charges different consumers different prices for the same good is 
said to engage in price discrimination.  Three conditions are necessary for price 
discrimination: (1) the seller must have enough monopoly power to set prices, (2) the 
firm must be able to divide customers into different groups with demand curves, and (3) 
consumers must not be able to engage in arbitrage.  The following model of the CWB 
  5behavior incorporates price discrimination across international malting barley markets.  
The objective of the CWB is to allocate the total quantity of malting barley it receives 
from producers in a given crop year across international malting barley markets in order 
to maximize the return to the pool.  Mathematically, the objective function can be 
written as follows:  
11
max ( ) ( )
i
nn
ii i i q
ii
PQq wRr c q π
==
=− − i ∑ ∑          (1) 
where Pi(Qi) denotes the inverse demand curve for malting barley in market i; Qi 
denotes aggregate quantity supplied to the market i; qi is the CWB’s sales of malting 
barley in market i; w(R) denotes the inverse supply curve of malting barley facing the 
CWB; R denotes aggregate purchase of malting barley; r is the purchase level of 
malting barley by the CWB; and ci is the unit marketing cost in market i.  Assume that 
the CWB markets all malting barley delivered by producers in a crop year, then Σiqi=r.  
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Equation (2) can be expressed in elasticity form as follows, 





























= price elasticity of demand for malting barley in market i,  















=price elasticity of supply of malting barley under CWB jurisdiction.  
ξi is an index of oligopoly power and θ is an index of oligopsony power.  They range in 
the unit interval with values of zero referring to perfectly competitive behavior and 
values of 1 denoting monopoly or monopsony behavior.  They are also known as 
“conjectural elasticities”.  The same equation can be written alternatively as 
i i i i i c w R MC Q MR P + − + = + − ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( θ θ ξ ξ          (4) 
where MRi(Qi)=Pi+Qi(∂ Pi /∂ Qi) is the marginal revenue curve in market i; and 
MC=w+R(∂w/∂R) is the marginal cost curve.  
 Figure 1 illustrates the supply cure and demand curve under competition, 
imperfect competition, and monopoly/monopsony.  To make the illustration clear, the 
graph is separated into two parts, (a) and (b).  When monopoly and monopsony power 
parameter is less than 1, the supply curve lies between the inverse supply curve w(R) 
and the associated marginal cost curve MC(R), and the inverse demand curve lies 
between the inverse demand curve P(R) and the associated marginal revenue curve 
MR(R).  The competitive equilibrium is given by the point of S
0/D
0, and the 
monopoly/monopsony equilibrium is given by the point S
1/D
1.     
  The CWB has the single desk marketing function for all malting barley, which 
implies directly that r=R.  However, the CWB is better classified as producer-agent and 
not as a processor with monopsony power (Schmitz and Furtan, 2000). 
 
The Simulations 
The simulation requires several parametric inputs: a demand elasticity (εi) for the 
domestic market and for each of the importing countries, a supply elasticity (η) for 
  7Canada and conjectural elasticities for each market supplied by Canada.  If supply and 
demand equations are specified as simple linear functions, the supply and demand 
elasticities will allow the specification of the linear model given initial market data on 
prices and quantities under competition.  It is assumed that the elasticity of demand for 
Canadian malting barley in the U.S. market was -2.74, as estimated by Schmitz and 
Gray (2000).  By assuming that price discrimination reflects revenue-maximizing 
behavior, we are able to calculate an implicit linear demand curve the CWB faced in 
each market by taking equal marginal revenue in each market.   
We are now ready to define the conjectural variation structure for Canadian 
malting barley through an oligopoly power parameter ξi for each of the importing 
countries.  Because the CWB is the single desk for marketing malting barley 
domestically, the oligopoly power parameter ξ for Canada domestic market is presumed 
to be of unitary value.   
With the objective to maximize the returns to producers through a pooling 
mechanism, the CWB equates its marginal revenue in the domestic market with its 
marginal revenue in each other market.  A market under CWB is used as the benchmark.  
Since grain trade might be highly concentrated even without STEs, different scenarios 
are defined in terms of market power exerted by a group of oligopolistic processors 
instead of the CWB.  In particular, 4 structures were defined: (a) market with a single 
STE that maximizes the pooled returns of its suppliers (b) a competitive scenario; (c) 
non-competitive scenario with modest market power; and (c) non-competitive 
oligopolistic scenario with greater market power of processors.  In the base scenario, 
although the CWB is the single-desk buyer of malting barley, the index of monopsony 
power θ is set as 0 because the CWB will return all surplus to producers after the 
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the competitive case, the market power indexes are zero, and the supply price and the 
selling price are equal.  In the non-competitive case with modest processor market 
power, the market power indexes are set as θ=ξ=0.05.  In the non-competitive case with 
greater processor market power, the market power indexes are set as θ=ξ=0.1. This 
reflects an increase in market power exerted by a group of processors but is less than 
what CWB would have with the single desk selling right of Canadian malting barley. 
The prices and quantities of malting barley sold to Canadian domestic and U.S. 
market in 1991/92, which were obtained from Schmitz and Gray (2000), were used to 
do the simulation.  We calculated the marginal revenue as well as the slope and 
intercept of the demand curve in the U.S. market using the price, quantity, and the 
demand elasticity in the U.S. market.  Then assuming the same marginal revenue in 
every other market, given the prices and quantities, we could then derive the elasticity, 
slope, and intercept of Canadian domestic demand curve.  The results are reported in 
Table 1.   
The economic effects of the STE and implied oligopoly processor structures are 
analyzed using measures of domestic producer surplus, consumer surplus, marketing 
firm profits, and deadweight loss.  
 
The Simulation Results 
The simulation results are reported in Table 2.  Complete mathematical 
specifications are omitted for space reasons, but are available from the authors upon 
request.  The first block of the table shows the producer surplus under the four 
simulated cases described earlier (CWB, competition, oligopoly processors with modest 
  9and greater market power).  The second block shows the consumer surplus in Canadian 
and the U.S market under each market scenario.  And the third block shows the middle 
profit under each market scenario. Not surprising, we show that single-desk selling 
generates the largest producer surplus, with at least 9.7 million dollars more than the 
next best case.   With oligopolistic processors, profits are not transmitted upstream and 
therefore, producer surplus in Canada decreases relative to the presence of a producer-
agent STE.  Canadian consumer is worse off under the CWB and there is a very large 
increase in consumer surplus with a change to oligopolistic processing.  The total 
surplus of Canada will be increased with a change from the CWB marketing to a 
competitive market by 3.3 million dollars.  If the marketing function is carried out by 
oligopolistic processors with modest market power, the total surplus of Canada will still 
be increased by 0.5 million dollars.  But if the processors have greater market power, 
the total surplus will be lower than that with the CWB marketing by roughly 2 million 
dollars.   
Because the U.S. welfare is derived from import demand, it does not convey 
the impact of Canadian barley marketing on U.S. producers and U.S. producer surplus 
cannot be measured in the context of the present simulation.  However, the simulation 
does provide information relevant for an assessment of effects on U.S. market, such as 
import prices and volumes.  This information is provided in table 3.  The negative 
relationship between the import volume and market power of sellers is expected.  At the 
same time, as shown in the table 3, U.S. malting barley prices are higher as a result of 
Canada’s single-desk selling than observed in a multiple environment, which suggests 
that the CWB withholds malting barley from the U.S. market.  One of the interesting 
results of this study relates to the political economy that is driving the debate regarding 
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distortions.  Most, if not all, of the concerns have come from producer groups.  The 
existence of STEs that have the ability to raise export prices have clearly definable 
benefits to not only the same-commodity producers in the importing country but also to 
the producers of close substitutes.   
 
Conclusions 
  In this study, we quantified the welfare, price and volume impacts of a change 
from the CWB single-desk selling to a multiple seller structure.  The analytic structure 
of the model follows from Huang and Sexton (1996), and extended to the CWB single 
desk selling.  Results of the analysis show that shifting from the CWB single desk 
structure to an oligopolistic (multiple marketers), makes the Canadian producer would 
be much worse off, lowers the price to U.S. barley producers and generates benefits to 
both Canadian and U.S. consumers.  The Canadian total surplus change depends on the 
multiple sellers’ market power.  In this study, it shows that if multiple sellers have 
modest market power, Canadian total surplus would be increased, while if multiple 
sellers have greater market power, Canadian total surplus would be decreased.  In the 
meantime, the results show that with the removal of the CWB, the U.S. import price 
would be lower and import volume would be higher no matter the degree of market 
power.   These outcomes would not be at all consistent with USDA objectives of raising 
farm prices of base commodities in the U.S.    
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Figure 1.  Perfect versus imperfect competition 
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Table 1. Parameters of Supply and Demand for CWB Malting Barley 
                   Price           Quantity                              Parameters 
                  ($/mt)           (000s mt)           Elasticity      Intercept      Slope 
Demand:  
  Canada                     163.09               91                  -1.96          246.28       -0.914 
  United States            125.81             288                  -2.74         171.73        -0.159 
Supply:                       133.44             462                        1                  0          0.289 
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      Table 2. Simulation Results: Welfare Effects from Different Market Scenarios   
                                     Change in                Change in                   Change in 
                                   Producer Surplus     Consumer Surplus          Processor Profit  
                                                              ($000s)                  ($000s)                      ($000s) 
                                                                                      Canada         U.S.       
        Base Case: CWB  
        Competitive                                 -9648.28           12971.55    1501.85                  0 
        Oligopolistic Processor replacing the CWB:           
        With modest market power         -11093.50          11594.99    1096.71              2906.73 
        With greater market power         -12418.60          10363.89      712.26              3809.38 
   
 








                                                                  
                                                               Price Change                    Volume Change 
                                                                 ($/ton)                                     (000s tones) 
        Base Case: CWB single desk marketing 
        Competitive                                         -4.06                                      25.44 
        Oligopolistic Processor replacing the CWB:         
        With modest market power                 -2.99                                      18.75 
        With greater market power                 -1.96                                       13.16              
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